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Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Homicide is the leading cause of death in Colombia.2 An
estimated 25,000 Colombians meet a violent death annually,
making Colombia's murder rate the highest in the world.3 Be-
tween 1987 and 1992, there were seventy-seven homicides per
100,000 people.4 In addition, during the first half of 1995,
19,450 homicides' were reported within a population of thirty-
1. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 1963.
2. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS &
CIVIL RIGHTS 1994-1995 195 (James Finn ed., 1995) [hereinafter FREEDOM IN THE
WORLD].
3. LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: ANDEAN GROUP REPORT, PROGRESS
MADE, BUT NGOs NOT SATISFIED 2 (Apr. 13, 1995).
4. U.S. DEPIT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1994, COLOMBIA 351 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS].
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1995, COLOMBIA, available from gopherJ/dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A23367%3ACo-
lombia (page references unavailable in this medium) (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter 1995
COUNTRY REPORTS]. This number has increased by 8,274 homicides for the compara-
ble period of time in 1994. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm'n on
Human Rights 1994, OEA/ser.LJVJII.88, doc. 9 rev. 132 (1995).
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six million.' The prevailing myth is that these deaths are pri-
marily drug-related.7 However, many of the killings are class-
based, entirely unconnected to drugs. Between 1986 and 1993,
20,000 Colombians died as a result of extrajudicial executions by
security forces, deaths in combat or "social cleansing."8
This Comment will focus on three aspects of the problem of
social cleansing in Colombia:9 (1) the Colombian National Police
and military's "social cleansing" operations; (2) the uncertain
role of the United States in providing future aid to Colombia to
fight the War on Drugs; and (3) the possibilities for ending
6. U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 93 (1995).
7. Leslie Wirpsa, Amnesty Report cites U.S. role in Colombia's political vio-
lence, 30 NAT'L CATH. REP., Apr. 1, 1994, at 9 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CO-
LOMBIA: POLITICAL VIOLENCE - MYTH AND REALITY (1994)).
8. Colombia Sec. of the Andean Comm'n of Jurists, quoted in 30 NAT'L CATH.
REP., Apr. 1, 1994, at 9). The Center for Investigations and Popular Research
(CINEP) reported 118 victims of social cleansing between January and June, 1995.
1995 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 5. Between January and October, 1994, there
were 291 homicides, fifty-seven injuries, and twenty-two threats reported that CINEP
considered part of social cleansing. 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 4.
Social cleansing is a euphemistic term describing the murder of people con-
sidered "undesirable." One of the first works to thoroughly document Colombia's
social cleansing is a joint report of the Colombia Human Rights Committee, Project
Dignity for Human Rights in Colombia, and the International Gay and Lesbian Hu-
man Rights Commission (IGLHRC). It was written by a courageous Colombian exile
and human rights attorney, Juan Pablo Ordofiez. See JUAN PABLO ORDONEZ, No
HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE: SOCIAL CLEANSING, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SEXUAL ORI-
ENTATION IN COLOMBIA (1995) [hereinafter NO HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE].
9. Social cleansing is not exclusive to Colombia. Violence throughout Latin
America is relatively common; similar situations exist in Brazil and Guatemala. See
generally FREEDOM IN THE WORLD, supra note 2. This Comment focuses only on
violence in Colombia for several reasons: the relative lack of public awareness about
the killings in Colombia, the influence of U.S. foreign policy there, and the zeal with
which the United States has targeted Colombia in its War on Drugs. This last factor
is particularly relevant, because Colombia's recent decertification by the U.S. marks
the first time this action has been taken against any Latin American country.
Yadira Ferrer, Drugs-Colombia: Will Decertification Harm or Help Samper?, INTER
PRESS SERV., Mar. 5, 1996. See also infra note 10, 129.
10. The phrase "War on Drugs" was popularized by President Ronald Reagan in
a 1982 speech in which he advocated aggressive supply-side efforts. See President's
Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1249 (Oct. 2, 1982).
On March 1, 1996, the U.S. decertified Colombia as an ally in the War on
Drugs pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986). Patti Lane, Bullets for Santacruz: Chastised by the U.S. as a Bad Partner in
the Drug War, Colombia Kills a Fugitive Trafficker Days Later, TIME INV'L, Mar. 18,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8824959. Decertification means a cessation of "bilateral
financial aid from Washington, with U.S. assistance restricted to the areas of human
rights, police and legal support." Yadira Ferrer, Colombia: Decertification is Vexation,
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 4, 1996. Decertification uses aid as leverage over foreign
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U.S. complicity in the human rights violations through action in
the American legislature and judiciary.
Social cleansing, or limpieza social, consists of "serial kill-
ings of people who have been economically pushed so far toward
the fringes of misery that the more affluent members of society
classify them as 'undesirable. '""' Social cleansing is an urban
phenomenon where the victims belong to a marginalized socio-
economic class and are perceived by the aggressors to be danger-
ous and unfit to participate in society.12 The victims include
indigents, street children, sexual minorities, 3 and sex work-
ers. 4 The aggressors are often soldiers, the National Police,
industrialists, guerrillas, or business owners looking to clean up
their store fronts. 5 The aggressors justify their actions with
concerns of "security, aesthetics, economic well-being, morals
and religion." 6
First, this Comment addresses social cleansing, a phenome-
governments to pressure them into "engaging in law enforcement measures such as
crop eradication, law enforcement militarization, extradition of foreign nationals, and
mutual legal assistance for prosecution." Sandi R. Murphy, Note, Drug Diplomacy
and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1263 (1990) (citation omitted). This move was probably a domestic political
decision on the part of President Clinton, in an election year, to appease critical
conservatives who question his commitment to hardline foreign policy, and Colombia
will most probably be recertified in the future. In fact, decertification probably will
not have a significant impact on social and economic conditions because there is "not
even a semblance of a rule of law in Colombia. How can hell get worse?" Telephone
Interview with Douglas Payne, Latin American Specialist, Freedom House (Mar. 19,
1996).
11. Leslie Wirpsa, Deadly 'social cleansing' hits Latino poor: Police are Killing
Kids In Columbia, Brazil, 30 NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 17, 1993, at 12.
12. EL ESPECTADOR, June 20, 1992, quoted in CARLOS EDUARDO ROJAS R., LA
VIOLENCIA LLAMADA LIMPIEZA SocIAL 9 (1994).
13. For a thorough discussion of the concept of sexual minorities and the global
human rights violations perpetrated against them, see JAMES D. WILETS, THE Hu-
MAN RIGHTS OF SEXUAL MINORITIES (forthcoming Winter 1997) (using the term, "sex-
ual minorities," to indicate that society oppresses those who are challenging tradi-
tionally defined gender roles, rather than those simply involved in same-sex rela-
tions).
14. "Sex worker" is a term preferred over "prostitute" as the latter is implicitly
judgmental. See, e.g., Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An
Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1992) (referring to prostitutes as
"sex workers").
15. NO HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 13. Because the focal
point of this comment is on state participation, the military and National Police are
the subjects of more intense scrutiny than are the other aggressors.
16. Id.
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non distinct from ethnic cleansing. The latter refers to extermi-
nating a group based on its ethnic identity - Bosnia being one
recent example - while social cleansing is generally defined as
class-based killing with little regard to religion or the color of a
victim's skin. 7 Moreover, social cleansing is distinguished from
the purely political killing,' designed to eradicate any oppo-
nents of the government, in that the former is geared toward
individuals and groups who pose no real threat to the govern-
ment; the "undesirables" simply do not have the power or the
resources to pose such a threat. Those who carry out the mur-
ders, however, view all of their victims as threats to the gov-
ernment. Thus, "undesirables" are seen as threats to the social
order.
Next, this Comment exposes four factors which contribute to
the existence and perpetuation of this problem. The first two are
structural and ideological elements endemic to Colombia. The
structural consideration involves the way in which the Colombi-
an Constitution gives an excessive amount of power to the Exec-
utive. 9 The second internal component is Colombia's whole-
hearted embrace of capitalism, a political ideology which blames
the poor for their own poverty. The impact of Colombia's politi-
cal and cultural traditions on human rights are aggravated by
external political and economic pressures from the United
States.
These political and economic factors within the U.S. are the
third and fourth reasons why social cleansing remains a fixture
on the Colombian landscape. The political pressures arise from
the U.S. interest in fighting the War on Drugs, and the economic
impact stems from investment interests, including oil, coffee and
flowers.
This Comment will analyze U.S. complicity in supporting
social cleansing in Colombia and argue that American funding
17. "Forced disappearances" are also common. For a discussion of this phenome-
non, see generally H.M. Kleinman, Disappearances in Latin America: a Human
Rights Perspective, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1033 (1987).
18. Victims of political killings include human rights monitors, journalists, peas-
ant organizers, and union supporters. For a thorough discussion of politically-moti-
vated killings with an emphasis on documenting specific cases, see AMERICAS
WATCH, POLITICAL MURDER AND REFORM IN COLOMBIA: THE VIOLENCE CONTINUES,
AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT (1992).
19. See infra part III.C.
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has violated, and is likely to continue to violate, several U.S.
laws20 that prohibit giving or loaning funds to countries engag-
ing in "a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations."21
Furthermore, a substantial amount of taxpayers' money sup-
ports the U.S. government's activity.
Finally, this Comment will focus on potential legal remedies
for U.S. complicity in both the U.S. Congress and courts.22 One
alternative is to lobby for passage of several proposed statutes,
as well as a push for compliance with the statutes that the cur-
rent policy violates. Additionally, this Comment will address the
issue of whether one could satisfy the difficult standing require-
ment to contest the violations in an American court: and wheth-
er the courts would likely consider it an "act of state," the for-
eign relations counterpart to the "political question" doctrine. 3
Social cleansing in Colombia in some respects parallels U.S.
domestic policies, particularly with regard to our own internal
War on Drugs and our dealings with indigents, drug addicts,
racial and sexual minorities, and sex workers as "throw-
aways."24 This Comment will argue that, in fact, the U.S. is
20. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 262d;
§ 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2304).
21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 262d(a), 2304(aX2).
22. A comprehensive analysis of available remedies in the international fora is
outside the scope of this Comment. The author will not address the possible reme-
dies the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) provide in response to re-
ports of governmental human rights violations. For a thorough discussion of the role
of the U.N., see Louis B. Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervi-
sion by the United Nations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 369-401 (Theo-
dore Meron ed., 1984); The UN Commission on Human Rights: 50th Session, 52
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 72 (1994). For a discussion of the functions of the OAS
and the IACHR, see J. Lauchloan Wash et al., The Inter-American Human Rights
System: Into the 1990s and Beyond, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 517 (1988); Thom-
as Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 439-93 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984).
23. See, e.g., Agapita Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207, slip op. (D. Haw. July 18,
1986) (holding that judicial review of the actions of a foreign sovereign committed
under color of state law are non-justiciable under the "act of state" doctrine).
24. The documentation of these problems in the United States has been as poor
as that of foreign atrocities. The Kerner National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders has criticized the media's coverage of racial problems in the U.S.: "[tthe
media report and write from the standpoint of a white man's world . . . [It] reflects
the biases, the paternalism, the indifference of white America." REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968), cited in John C. Bolger,
Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect - An Introduc-
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struggling with its own drug problem by funding a war on drugs
whose barbaric methods - if carried out on U.S. soil - would cer-
tainly violate its avowed commitment to civil rights. In effect,
the U.S. is trying to resolve its internal conflicts surrounding
class and drugs while exacerbating the same or similar conflicts
abroad. United States citizens have a vested interest in protect-
ing against rampant human rights violations in Colombia. To
the degree that our values are reflected in our foreign policy, we
are revealing a dubious commitment to civil rights with our tacit
support of the human rights violations in Colombia.
II. CONFLICT: THE HUNTED
An average of five people daily fall victim to social cleans-
ing,25 targeting socially undesirable2" individuals.27 The com-
mon characteristic among those seen as disposable is poverty.
Currently, forty-six percent of Colombia's population lives below
the poverty line,2" and an estimated twelve million people live
in a state of critical poverty.29 This is over three times the pov-
erty rate in the United States. 0 The Colombian government
tion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1349 n.58 (1993).
25. LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: ANDEAN GROUP REPORT, supra note 3,
at 2.
26. See generally ROJAS, supra note 12.
27. Juan Pablo Ordofiez points out that not all victims of social cleansing are
considered per se "disposable"; there is evidence that Jews, ethnic minorities, and
criminals who do not live on the street are victims of social cleansing. NO HUMAN
BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 15.
28. Steven Ambrus, Colombian Candidates Fail to Inspire Voters, L.A. TIMES,
May 28, 1994, at A18. For information about poverty in Colombia, see THE WORLD
BANK, POVERTY IN COLOMBIA (1994). The report reveals that several poverty lines
are used in the incidence analysis due to the arbitrary nature of defining a poverty
line. The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) determines
the "indigence line," indicating the incidence of poverty by compiling the numbers of
people who make an average of fifty percent of the average monthly per capita in-
come in rural areas, and an average of twenty-five percent in urban areas (because
the rural poor are poorer than the urban poor). DANE calculates the poverty line by
doubling the indigence line in rural areas and taking 2.3 times that in urban areas.
Id. at 2 nn.1-2.
29. Consejo Gremial Nacional, Hacia una Politica de Desarrollo Colombiano at
35, quoted in NO HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 12.
30. The United States' poverty rate was 14.2% in 1991. NUMBER IN POVERTY
HITS 20-YEAR HIGH AS RECESSION ADDS 2 MILLION MORE POOR, ANALYSIS FINDS 4,
CENTER ON BUDGET & BUDGET POLICY PRIORITIES (1992), cited in John C. Boger,
Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect - An Introduc-
tion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1993).
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and upper classes view the poor as "surplus."31 Rather than
trying to deal with systemic problems, the existing structure
blames the poor for their poverty.32 Therefore, social class is the
operative factor in deeming individuals undesirable.
A. Children Living in Poverty
In Colombia, indigent street children are a primary target of
the social cleansing operations; one child is murdered every four
hours.33 In BogotA alone, there are over 4,000 homeless chil-
dren over fifteen years of age and 3,500 under fourteen.' Leslie
Wirpsa, who has written extensively on the subject of human
rights abuses in Colombia, states that in 1993 alone, according
to data supplied by the Colombian government, 2,190 street chil-
dren were murdered, many of whom were killed by agents of the
state.' Only twelve of these killings have come to trial. 6
The only justification for these killings offered by the Na-
tional Police is the assumption that all street children are in-
volved in drug trafficking 7 and therefore pose a significant
threat to society. While many are recruited by drug dealers,38
31. Paul Jeffrey, Social Cleansing in Colombia, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 12,
1995, at 380.
32. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 34.
33. "With perhaps greater frequency, children who have been arrested are
beaten, raped, given electric shocks and tortured, primarily by members of the police
force, an institution that receives $20 million in U.S. security aid annually." Leslie
Wirpsa, Children Risk Violent Deaths in Colombia, NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 13, 1995,
at 6 [hereinafter Children Risk Violent Deaths].
34. Ken Dermota, "Social Cleansing" Targets Street Children, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 6, 1994, at 14.
35. Children Risk Violent Deaths, supra note 33.
36. Tim Ross, Colombia Assailed Over Street Kids' Plight, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
5, 1994, at A10 (citing AMERICAS WATCH, GENERATION UNDER FIRE (1995) ("to be a
poor child, a runaway, a child prostitute, or a child in a war zone in Colombia is to
live with the threat of murder in daily intimacy.")).
37. Many Colombian youths are indeed involved in gangs and militias, which
has led to the erroneous perception that all children are criminals. Children Risk
Violent Deaths, supra note 33 (quoting AMERICAS WATCH, GENERATION UNDER FIRE
(1995)). Children are also involved in the drug trade in the United States. Children
are seen as the perfect drug dealers because they are not suspected, are loyal and
almost immune from the law. Regina Austin, 'The Black Community," Its Lawbreak-
ers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1782 (1992) (citations
omitted).
38. Ross, supra note 36.
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the reality is that most street children are suspected of delin-
quency because they are poor and must engage in petty shoplift-
ing to subsist. "The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare re-
ported that 31,818 minors had been abandoned or were in dan-
ger in 1992."' 9
Ironically, law enforcement officials are likely the greatest
threat to Colombian youth. For example, investigations of the
1992 massacre of eight children, some of whom were activists
who had protested National Police abuses, have implicated the
U.S. trained F-2 National Police intelligence squad and the judi-
cial police.' The Colombian government has been forced to re-
form the National Police through stricter internal disciplinary
measures following a 1993 incident involving a nine-year-old girl
who was raped and strangled in a National Police detention
room.
41
B. Sexual Minorities Living in Poverty
Sexual minorities are another group impacted by social
cleansing operations. Sexual minorities "[include] all individuals
who have traditionally been distinguished by societies because of
their sexual orientation, inclination, behavior, or nonconformity
with gender roles or identity."42  Colombia legalized
homosexuality in 1980.' There is a sizable gay community,"
mostly concentrated in the big cities,' but discrimination
against sexual minorities is nevertheless rampant.46
39. No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 17 n.19 (quoting EL
TIEMPO (Oct. 1993)).
40. Children Risk Violent Deaths, supra note 33.
41. No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 18 ("The reforms have
been completely ineffective, and the police continue to be the principal violators of
human rights.").
42. WILETS, supra note 13, at 2.
43. Prior to the enactment of Decree 100 in 1980, the Criminal Code of 1936
punished homosexuality. See No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 16.
44. In 1994, Ordofiez founded the Colombia Association of Gays and Lesbians,
whose 120 members remain anonymous. Jennifer McKim, Vigilante Slayings of Co-
lombian Gays Alleged, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1995, at 8. In an interview, Ordofiez
remarked, "[t]hey are afraid of losing their jobs, they would be thrown out of their
homes." Id.
45. BogotA has sixty establishments serving "an exclusively gay clientele," and
there are at least three gay establishments in most of the medium-sized cities. No
HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 59.
46. Id. (documenting the harassment gays face when members of the police and
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"While homosexuality is not outlawed in Colombia, gays are
among the desechables (disposables) routinely assassinated
by off-duty military officers . . . [Other] social outcasts [are
killed, but] special ire is reserved for homosexuals, who are
tortured and raped and whose bodies are dismembered in
particularly gruesome ways.""
It is estimated that at least three individuals who admit to
being sexual minorities are killed each week in Colombia's poor
neighborhoods." Juan Pablo Ordofiez points out that any num-
ber estimating gay murder victims is underrepresentative:
[Dleath certificates.., of murdered men list them as homo-
sexuals only if they were dressed in women's clothing at the
time they were killed. All government and non-governmental
statistics of homosexual murders are based on these identifi-
cations. However, transvestites are a minority within the
homosexual community, and many homosexuals whose rights
are violated are not transvestites. Thus, the statistics are far
from realistic and many human rights violations against
homosexuals go unnoticed.49
C. Other Victims
Statistics show that from 1988 to 1993, thirty-five percent of
social cleansing victims were criminals and 21.3% were drug ad-
dicts.' Arguably, these groups are hardest hit by social cleans-
ing in that the numbers of victims are so large. Particularly
distressing is the fact that the advocates of these victims fear
that their outrage will be seen as condoning criminal conduct.5 1
Sex workers are also perceived as not fit to participate in
army raid bars and extort money from people discovered to be gay).
47. Robert Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for
Gay and Lesbian Integration, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (1994) (citation omit-
ted).
48. McKim, supra note 44, at 8. A Colombian human rights group called Grupo
de Ambiente estimated that 328 gay men were murdered by death squads from
1986-1990. See WILETS, supra note 13, at 81 n.256.
49. No HuMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 16.
50. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 27 (these groups often overlap and it is thus diffi-
cult to refer to them separately).
51. No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 20.
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society.2 The act of prostitution is legal, but soliciting it is ille-
gal, as are brothels.53 There is a large number of female sex
workers, 5' 36.3% of whom are induced into prostitution because
of a lack of income.55 There is also a large population of male
sex workers who are often harassed by the authorities." The
National Police often demand a "tax" from them where failure to
pay results in beatings or imprisonment.57
Another group targeted by social cleansing operations is the
recicladores, or recyclers. They pick through the trash looking
for reusable items as their chief source of income. They are fre-
quently killed and their bodies are sold to the local University
for use in the medical school.5" In 1994, National Police inten-
tionally set ablaze three indigent people who were sleeping in
cars. One of the victims stated that the police officers laughed as
the victims burned.59
III. BACKGROUND: THE HUNTERS
Liberal and Conservative parties currently dominate the
political scene in Colombia." In 1994, Colombian voters elected
Liberal Party candidate Ernesto Samper Pizano to serve as
President until 1998.1 Samper has issued several state-
52. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 25.
53. No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8, at 24.
54. The most recent study, conducted in 1991 by the Chamber of Commerce of
BogotA, reported 14,211 sex workers in the city of BogotA. Id. at 25.
55. Lack of skills training was the second most common reason (27.4%), fol-
lowed by domestic violence (22.3%), unemployment (10.2%), and other reasons (3.8%).
On the whole, 73.8% of prostitution is induced by economic factors. Id.
56. Id. at 26.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 23 (finding that the National Police were reportedly receiving U.S.
$150 per corpse).
59. Id.
60. These two parties are distinguished from the liberal and conservative politi-
cal ideologies as they are known in the United States. In Colombia, the chief dis-
tinction is in the parties' view of the role of the clergy in the political arena. Lib-
erals, who tend to favor a more federalist government, see the clergy as an impedi-
ment to progress. Conservatives, who tend to favor a centralist government, see the
church as a unifying force which can keep society from unravelling. See David
Bushnell, Politics and Violence in Nineteenth Century Colombia, in VIOLENCE IN CO-
LOMBIA: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 24-29 (Charles
Bernquist et al. eds., 1992).
61. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights, OEA/ser. LJVJ2.88, doc. 9 rev. (1995). Samper
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ments"2 saying that he hopes to improve the human rights situ-
ation in Colombia.' However, his objectives have failed to sig-
nificantly improve conditions in Colombia, 4 partly because his
government has not allocated the necessary funds to combat the
problem.6"
The Colombian government is a constitutional democracy,
but because of the executive's power to give the military com-
plete control through the "state of siege, " " Colombia can more
accurately be characterized as a country ruled by executive fi-
at. 7 Colombia is commonly referred to as a "democracy without
people," and has also been termed a "democra-tatorship" 9
was elected amid allegations, which persist, that drug money financed his campaign.
See, e.g., Claim that Samper Campaign Got Cartel Money 'Verified,' MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 10, 1995, at A27.
62. In an unprecedented admission, Samper made public and took responsibility
for the Trujillo massacre detailed in the 1995 Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission report (in which government actors murdered 100 peasants) and other Co-
lombian human rights violations. Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm'n on
Human Rights 1994, supra note 5, at 139.
63. Samper has reportedly established a program to educate Colombia's military
about human rights abuses and how to avoid them. However, Jose Miguel DeVanco,
head of Human Rights Watch Americas says that nobody has really put into practice
any effective measures to stop the violence, and urges the United States to exert its
influence through diplomatic channels. All Things Considered: Human Rights Advo-
cate Urges U.S. to Use More Leverage, Interview with Jose Miguel DeVanco, Direc-
tor, Human Rights Watch Americas (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 11, 1994),
Transcript No. 1692-2 [hereinafter All Things Considered].
64. 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 4, at 351.
65. To use Cali as an example, Francisco Murgueito, the city's high commis-
sioner for peace, notes that Cali's budget for combatting social cleansing is a mere
$500,000. Howard LaFranchi, A Drug World Capital Struggles to Get a Life, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 9, 1995, at 6. See also Norman Kempster, Rights Panel
Demands Colombia Prosecute its Soldiers, Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at
A6.
66. For a discussion of the state of siege provisions and the resulting sacrifice
of human rights, see infra text accompanying notes 120-129.
67. Mark A. Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extra-
dition, and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L. REV. 661, 686 (1991).
68. JENNY PEARCE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH 206-7 (1990)
("Marginalised economically and politically, the state has reserved for the majority
the 'state of siege' and all the exceptional repressive legislation and procedures that
can guarantee order where other mechanisms fail."); Noam Chomsky, Introduction, in
No HUMAN BEING IS DISPOSABLE, supra note 8 (noting that the Latin American Bu-
reau in Britain once described Colombia as a "democracy without people").
69. Chomsky, supra note 68, at xv (using the term "democra-tatorship," which
was coined by Eduardo Galeano for Colombia).
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because of the government's use of violence7 ° to maintain social
order given the large gap between the rich and the poor.7
These structural elements of Colombian society maintains the
social cleansing operations.
A. The Development of Violence
Colombia's history has been characterized by frequent peri-
ods of political violence.7" In fact, a thirteen-year period of
Colombia's history is known as La Violencia (The Violence).73
The original conflict stemmed from a civil war between the Lib-
erals and Conservatives which plagued Colombia since the nine-
teenth century.74 While some of today's violence stems from
guerilla groups, much of the current political conflict is still
between the Liberals and Conservatives. 5 What started as a
battle to establish the political power of the parties developed
into full-fledged class-based warfare.76
70. This violence includes killing, torture, harassment and "disappearing."
71. See Ramon Isberto, New Democracies Can't Cope with Rise of Violence,
INTER PRESS SERV., Dec. 9, 1991 (quoting Eric Sottas, a Swiss national who heads
the World Organization Against Torture). There is a "double state" in the new de-
mocracies. "Real power is in the hands of private groups who use paramilitary
groups to protect their privileged status." Id.
72. See generally PEARCE, supra note 68, at 49-66; VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA,
supra note 60. The problem of violence is one that faces Latin America as a whole.
Influence from the U.S., French, and German cultures has had a negative impact on
the treatment of human rights in Latin America. One theory is that France, during
the Algerian War of Independence, informed the Latin American cultures of rigid,
simplistic distinctions between "good and evil, friend and foe, and of the methods of
total elimination which were employed." Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Domestic Policies
and External Influences on the Human Rights Debate in Latin America, in FOREIGN
POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ISSUES AND RESPONSES 105, 107 (R.J. Vincent ed.,
1986).
73. This period occurred between 1948-1965. PEARCE, supra note 68, at 49-66.
74. Id. at 51.
75. KEviN JACK RILEY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF COLOMBIAN DRUG INDUSTRY AND
DEATH SQUAD POLITICAL VIOLENCE FOR U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY 7 (A Rand
Note) (1993) (a document prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).
76. Much of the continuing violence since the 1930s is a "by-product of the re-
peated and generally frustrated attempts by the country's marginalised sectors and
emerging social forces to gain a greater share of Colombia's abundant wealth." LAW-
RENCE BOUDON, GUERRILLAS AND THE STATE: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE CO-
LOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS 4 (1995) (unpublished manuscript submitted to Journal of
Latin American Studies) (on file with author).
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Social cleansing as a manifestation of the class-based war-
fare began on December 5, 1979, in the city of Periera,7 and
has since expanded throughout the entire country7 with fre-
quent incidents in the major cities of Bogota, Cali, Medellin and
Barranquilla.79 Conceived by the city's Office of Security as a
means to combat increasing activity of thieves, the original
method was to mark the thief s face and hands with indelible
red ink.8" This practice ended on January 13, 1980, when one
victim was hospitalized after trying to remove the ink with ac-
id. s'
In November, 1979, bodies of assassinated victims began to
appear with their hands tied behind their backs and bullets in
their heads. 2 A preferred method of assassination in Medellin
is "the ride," whereby the death squads make the victim board a
vehicle, kill him, and then leave the body in an unpopulated
area." Those ritualized killings spread from the major cities to
the rural areas and began targeting a wider range of groups."
The Colombian press began to publish reports that "death
squads" 5 were carrying out these atrocities to rid the country
of undesirables."s
The means used to identify undesirables is by appearance.
Dirty people with matted hair and bad teeth are assumed to be
delinquents. 7 Men dressed in drag are killed because it is as-
sumed they are homosexual." The aggressors' stated intentions
are to provide security to the citizenry and to discipline, dis-
place, and confine delinquents.89
77. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 15.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Telephone Interview with Juan Pablo Ordofiez, Esq., Founder and Executive
Director, Project Dignity for Human Rights (Oct. 6, 1995).
80. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 16.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 23.
85. The number of death squads in 1992 was estimated at 140. RILEY, supra
note 75, at 2 n.2.
86. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 16.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id. Sexual minorities, including sex workers, it is said, began to be targets
in collective actions when they got caught in a crossfire aimed at drug traffickers.
89. Id. at 57-58.
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B. The 1991 Constitutional Reforms
The 1991 Constitution" was created to strengthen democ-
racy and the rule of law in a country experiencing widespread
political violence." It attempted to accomplish this goal in
three ways.92 First, it permitted the existence of a wider range
of political parties93 and assured all citizens the right to vote.9
Second, there was movement toward equalizing the division of
powers between the three branches of government by granting
greater powers to the legislative and judicial branches to com-
pensate for the previously dominant executive branch.95 Third,
it established a human rights agenda and the formation of orga-
nizations to safeguard these rights.96
The Constitution provides for many protections not included
in most constitutions of the Western world. 7 Were the docu-
ment adhered to, Colombian society could be a bastion of free-
dom and liberty for its inhabitants. Human rights concerns 8
apparently were of paramount importance in drafting the docu-
ment.9 9 The Constitution created several new causes of action
allowing citizens to challenge arbitrary governmental actions.
One such challenge is the controversial tutela, °" which is a
temporary measure to prevent irreparable harm. It provides for
the immediate protection of one's "fundamental constitutional
rights" by entering an injunction against "individuals entrusted
with providing a public service or whose conduct may affect
seriously and directly the collective interest or in respect of
90. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION] (enacted
Feb. 5, 1991) [COLOM. CONST.].
91. Donald T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform: Prospects
for Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 139
(1992).
92. See generally id. (enumerating the several causes of action added by the
new Colombian Constitution and considering the human rights provisions and meth-
ods for their implementation).
93. COLOM. CONST. art. 40, cl. 3.
94. Id. art. 40.
95. Fox & Stetson, supra note 91, at 139.
96. Id.
97. Jayni Edelstein, Colombia: Impact of the New Constitution, 47 INT'L CoMMN
JURISTS REV. 4 (1991).
98. One can find these provisions primarily in COLOM. CONST. tits. 1, 2.
99. Fox & Stetson, supra note 91, at 154.
100. COLOM. CONST. art. 86.
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whom the applicant may find himself/herself in a state of subor-
dination or vulnerability."1 ' While this new measure has been
partially effective 1 2 in protecting rights to adequate health
care, equal protection, due process, and equal opportunity in the
workplace, social cleansing circumvents the tutela by denying its
victims the opportunity to vindicate their constitutionally-guar-
anteed rights.
Because one-third of the Constitution's provisions will re-
quire legislative enactments to take effect, support of these mea-
sures by the Colombian Congress is vital 3 or the human
rights guarantees become empty promises. ' " To address this
concern, the Constitution creates a mechanism to effectuate the
changes in human rights policies; the Defensor del Pueblo (De-
fender of the People)0 5 under the Public Ministry. This office,
independent of the executive, is charged with protecting human
rights by representing the people alleging governmental viola-
tions. Ideally, the new Constitution's positive changes would
result in increased accountability and a greater awareness of the
importance of respecting human rights. Nevertheless, problems
still remain.
C. Impunity
The new Constitution failed to make some fundamental,
structural changes. Perhaps the most flagrant is the broadening
of the military's functions, effectively increasing the already
rampant impunity with which violations are committed by arms
of the government."° A complaint frequently voiced against the
101. Id.
102. Of the 2500 actions for tutela brought by private citizens in the first four
months of 1992, 209 were decided in favor of the complainant. Fox & Stetson, supra
note 91, at 160 (citing roundtable discussion with Manuel Josd Cepeda, Presidential
Advisor for the Development of the Constitution, Republic of Colombia, at Columbia
University Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies (May 11, 1992)).
103. See Fox & Stetson, supra note 91, at 140.
104. Edelstein, supra note 97, at 5.
105. COLOM. CONST. arts. 281-84. It is similar to the ombudsman in European
countries. See Edelstein, supra note 97.
106. Limitations on the military's power were proposed in the new constitution,
but were successfully lobbied against by the military. Fox & Stetson, supra note 91,
at 162.
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Constitution is that it lets the military courts try members of
the armed forces for human rights violations." 7 Furthermore,
the office of the Attorney General has excepted from the crimes
it must investigate any crimes committed by members of the
public force in the course of their service."'~ This perpetuates
the problematic secret trials and, in effect, "constitutionally en-
shrines impunity.""°
No matter how one defines and describes "the state,""0 it
is apparent that the Colombian government is engaged in pro-
moting social cleansing. Narcotics traffickers and paramilitary
groups violate human rights along with, and often sanctioned
by, official forces."' In 1992, seventy-four percent of the 4,300
murders were attributed to the National Police, armed forces
and their paramilitary clients." 2
These groups are rarely held accountable; ninety-seven
percent of crimes go unpunished."' Since there is no effective
system of punishment or deterrence, the majority of crimes are
carried out with impunity." 4 The Colombian judicial system
frequently assists in covering up many of these atrocities."'
107. COLOM. CONST. art. 221 provides, "[r]egarding the crimes committed by the
members of the public force in active service, and in connection with the same ser-
vice, they will appear before military courts or military tribunals, in accordance with
the provisions of the Military Penal Code." Id. See also Fox & Stetson, supra note
91, at 162.
108. COLOM. CONST. art. 250.
109. Edelstein, supra note 97, at 9.
110. Scholars have argued that the state is more than just an agency providing
public goods, but rather an entity comprised of public services, legal systems, securi-
ty and public administration. BOUDON, supra note 76, at 13. See also COLOM. CONST.
tit. 1, art. 2 (stating the essential goals of the state); tit. 12, ch. 5 (enumerating the
social purposes of the state).
111. The limited scope of this Comment requires a focus on the aggressors who
act as a functional arm of the government since it is the violence carried out under
color of law that is most egregious, particularly where the government has been
heavily funded by the U.S.
112. See Colombian Section of the Andean Comm'n of Jurists, cited in THE NA-
TION, May 17, 1993); Vigilantes in Colombia Kill Hundreds of "Disposables," N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1994, at A7 (stating that "members of the security forces have been
directly implicated in several killings," and quoting an official at the Attorney
General's office claiming that, "[tihere is evidence that members of the police go to
these neighborhoods at night and shoot or burn children alive.").
113. 1995 COUNTRY REPORTS supra note 5.
114. An estimated 1.2 to 2% of all crimes have ended in a sentence over the
past 30 years. Michael Pahl, Wanted: Criminal Justice: Colombia's Adoption of a
Prosecutorial System of Criminal Procedure, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 608-34 (1992)
(citation omitted).
115. For example, judicial authorities deemed the farmer who witnessed the
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The death squads justify their actions by asserting the ineffectu-
al nature of the judiciary in punishing criminals."' In refer-
ring to this "private justice," one commentator expressed the
belief that, "[t]he judicial system is so discredited that it never
even occurs to anyone to resort to the law.
" 117
Fortunately, those responsible, at least in the National Po-
lice force, are slowly beginning to take responsibility for their
actions. An average of seven officers are fired daily for improper
conduct, even though none have been sentenced for their role in
social cleansing.' President Samper has publicly expressed
concern about impunity. "9 Nevertheless, whether real change
will result from his platitudes remains to be seen.
Constitutional provisions and presidential pronouncements
are mere formalities if practice undermines those pro-
tections. 2 ' In actuality, methods such as the State of Emergen-
1990 chain-saw beheadings of thirty-seven people a paranoid psychopath and sent
him to a mental hospital, rather than prosecuting the killers. Norman Kempster,
"Rights Panel Demands Colombia Prosecute Its Soldiers, Sources Say; Massacre: OAS
Group Wants Compensation for Survivors, Country's President Has Admitted Army
Troops Killed More Than 100 Peasants in Two-Year Reign of Terror," L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1995, at A6.
116. This problem is circular in that complaints of an ineffective judiciary result
in people "taking the law into their own hands" - yet part of their vigilante justice
is to threaten judges into complying with their wishes so true justice is too threat-
ened to prevail. See Pahl, supra note 114; Richard L. Fricker, A Judiciary Under
Fire: In Bogotd, Bullets and Hard Questions About U.S. Drug Policies, 76 A.B.A. J.
54-58 (Feb., 1990); PEARCE, supra note 68, at 268-69. ("[The state] is ceasing to be a
regulator of social conflict or a dispenser of justice and equality of opportunity. The
gigantic stain of impunity has spread to almost all our public activities.") (quoting
Alvaro Tirado Mejia, presidential human rights adviser, Declaration to the Encuentro
Nacional, 'la lucha contra la impunidad, avances y dificultades,' Sept. 19, 1988)).
117. Dermota, supra note 34, at 14 (quoting Sonia Zambrano, researcher for the
Andean Commission of Jurists, Colombian Section).
118. Id. (quoting Col. Eduardo Arevalo, spokesman for the Defense Ministry, of
which the National Police is a part).
119. President Samper stated that,
Impunity has attained alarming levels in Colombia, resulting in a sub-
stantial increase in human rights violations in the country. We are faced
with a widespread phenomenon of criminal conduct that overtaxes the
capacity of the legal system. To confront it, the justice system shall be
given the necessary human, financial, physical and technical resources to
carry out its duties. It is indispensable that the punitive authority of the
state be brought to bear with full weight on the conduct of those who
betray their trust as protectors of democratic legality. To this end the
government will press with its utmost political will and determination.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm'n of Human Rights 1994, supra note 5.
120. Tom J. Farer, Reinforcing Democracy in Latin America: Notes Toward an
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cy'2 1 have been imposed by the Colombian executive branch for
thirty-six out of the last forty-eight years.'22 This clever tool
allows the government to strengthen the armed forces as well as
to criminalize the minimal offenses often committed by the
poor. 123 These effects benefit the middle and upper classes in
Colombia by keeping "undesirables" off the street,'2' while at
the same time Samper makes statements committing himself to
human rights reforms which are not implemented.
States of Emergency 12  have been codified in Colombian
law since the Constitution of 1886.126 The current Constitution
also provides for them2 7 but states that, during this period,
"[n]either human rights nor fundamental freedoms may be sus-
pended.""2 Sadly, this provision, like many others, is virtually
ignored by the Colombian government, and provides a loophole
through which human rights abuses can be legitimized while
granting a higher degree of impunity.'
Appropriate Legal Framework, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 434 (1988) ("Where the process is
weak, the formal law is a formality.").
121. Also known as a state of siege, and, in the translation of the Colombian
constitution, as a state of exception. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, COLOMBIA 212 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995).
122. 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 4, at 350.
123. Telephone Interview with Juan Pablo Ordofiez, supra note 79.
124. Id.
125. For a thorough, yet somewhat outdated discussion of the effects of the
states of siege in Colombia, see INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY:
THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45-67 (1983).
126. COLOM. CONST. art. 121 (1886). This provision gave the President the power
to declare, with the approval of his ministers, a state of siege during an internal
disturbance and to expand the government's powers during such a time to those it
would have in times of war.
127. Id. art. 213 provides, in pertinent part:
In the case of a serious disruption of the public order imminently
threatening institutional stability, the security of the state, or peaceful
coexistence of the citizenry, and which cannot be met by the use of the
ordinary powers of the police authorities . . . [the President may declare
a state of siege for no more than ninety days, extendable twice, the sec-
ond time with Senate approval].
Id.
128. Id. art. 214.
129. "The government attributes the continuing violence in Colombia largely to
the drug traffickers, but uses the crack-down as a pretext to legitimize state repres-
sion." Colombia: The Other Faces of the War Against the Mafia, 43 INT'L COMM'N JU-
RISTS REv. 6, 8 (1989).
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
Until the recent decertification, the United States Govern-
ment gave more money to Colombia than to any other Latin
American country;130  Colombia had been the Western
Hemisphere's largest recipient of U.S. military aid, 3' and
might regain that status.'32 The money was given specifically
to curb the supply-side narcotics trade, but the U.S. ac-
knowledges that much of its money has been used to fight
Colombia's civil war.' Support from executive agencies, main-
ly the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), has helped keep the corrupt Colom-
bian government in control and stocked with deadly weap-
130. For fiscal year 1996, the U.S. allocated a total of $79.4 million. Congres-
sional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1996.
131. Jeffrey, supra note 31, at 380.
132. Commentators are speculating that this measure is a temporary one which
is designed to motivate Colombia in its counternarcotics efforts. Telephone Interview
with Douglas Payne, supra note 10. It is plausible that the U.S. is so eager to bring
about the end of Samper's presidency that it used decertification on the drug issue
as a shroud for its true goal. Some Colombian business leaders and politicians have
described the decertification as "a moral sanction" against the Samper regime to be
lifted once Samper falls. Ferrer, supra note 9.
133. U.S. Government Anti-Narcotics Activities in the Andean Region of South
America: Hearing of the Permanent Investigations Subcomm. of the Senate Govern-
mental Affairs Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Melvyn Levitsky, testifying on
behalf of the Department of State, stated that the priority is "to help the govern-
ments concerned gain control and restor civil authority." Mr. Levitsky later says, in
response to Senator Sam Nunn's criticism of a program lacking crop substitution and
economic development,
whatever we do against drugs, if we reduce demand in this [drug-produc-
ing] country so we don't need the product anymore, the effect of that will
drive those people who are growing the drugs into the hands of - or
towards something else, and maybe it will be into the hands of the guer-
rillas.
Mr. Levitsky's statements show a lack of regard for human life and result in foreign
policy which recklessly assumes that the entire citizenry is involved in drug-produc-
tion. He also assumes that force is the most effective way to curb this problem. See
also THIRTEENTH REPORT BY THE COMMIrrEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TOGETH-
ER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS, STOPPING THE FLOOD OF COCAINE WITH OPERATION
SNOWCAP: IS IT WORKING? 80 (1990) (reporting the testimony of a U.S. embassy offi-
cial in BogotA recognizing that U.S. aid funds counterinsurgency efforts as well as
narcotics control: [It] was not U.S. policy to tell the Colombians what equipment
they needed or how to use the United States-provided assets."), quoted in Elena S.
Manitzas, Human Rights, Justice, and U.S. Aid: The Colombian Contradiction, 1 U.
MIAMI Y.B. IN'L L. 309, 323 n.38 (1991).
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Stopping the drug supply is not the only interest the United
States has in giving money to Colombia. The U.S. has significant
investment interests in Colombia's natural 35 and manufac-
tured"3 commodities. The U.S. is Colombia's principal trading
partner. As one commentator reminds us: "[F]avorable invest-
ment conditions are often systematically maintained by oppres-
sive regimes at steep human rights costs."'37
Among the most vital of Colombia's investment interests is
its oil reserve. Colombia has recently discovered that it has some
of the largest oil fields in Latin America. 138 One United States
oil company has allegedly bribed Colombian authorities to se-
cure its position in the impending oil rush. 39 This undertaking
is in clear violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),'" which prohibits U.S. companies from bribing foreign
officials. This investment interest may well tie into the reluc-
tance of the U.S. to enforce its own laws, which would demand
Colombia's compliance with international human rights norms.
A. U.S. Aid to Fight the War on Drugs
In a discussion about Colombia, past and present U.S. drug
policy, both internal and external, cannot be ignored. The U.S.
response to Colombia's production and export of cocaine has
been to provide staggering amounts of funds, police and military
training to the Colombian government to combat drug traffick-
ing."" For the 1996 fiscal year, $35 million was allocated to
134. All Things Considered, supra note 63.
135. The U.S. imports 39% of Colombia's natural commodities - petroleum,
coffee, coal, flowers and fruit. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 6, at 94.
136. The U.S. imports 36% of Colombia's manufactured commodities. Id.
137. Carlo Filice, On the Obligation to Keep Informed About Distant Atrocities,
12 HuM. RTS. Q. 397, 411 (1990).
138. Wirpsa, supra note 11, at 11; U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD
FACTBOOK 40 (1994) ("A major oil find in 1993 in eastern Colombia may provide an
extra $3 billion annually to the economy by 1997.").
139. Id.
140. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (1995) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FCPA]. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the FCPA, see Walter Sterling Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293-303 (1979).
141. For a thorough discussion of U.S. policy against drugs in Colombia and a
breakdown of the aid given, see RILEY, supra note 75, at 44-50.
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Colombia in the "narcotics" category.4 1 In reaction to several
narcotic-related murders in Colombia in 1989, the United States
approved $65 million'" in emergency aid and an additional
$2.5 million to provide security for Colombian judges.'"
Among the judges who went on strike to get additional pro-
tection was Judge Helmoot Romero.'" Romero is critical of the
U.S. role, stating that it is "anxious to fight drug lords, but
frightfully slow to solve the social problems that reinforce the
drug trade in Colombia and at home."'" This statement repre-
sents a central argument of this Comment: the U.S. is losing the
War on Drugs from the consumer end and instead has tolerated
the use of brutality on foreign soil to combat the supply end, all
the time ignoring the social forces which induce people to con-
sume and supply drugs.
Romero asserts an alternative: "More could be done to boost
the economy and thereby lessen the temptation that draws peas-
ants into the drug-processing trade."'47 The U.S. could be in-
strumental in helping legitimate industries to thrive, but instead
has had a hand in gutting several.'" The U.S. has destroyed
the coffee cartel, 49 according to judicial and political leaders in
Colombia,'50 while clamoring for Colombia to increase expendi-
tures on its drug war. This is ironic given that the only money
available to spend on fighting the drug war in Colombia, exclud-
ing income from licit business, is, of course, drug money in some
form or another. Decertification is likely to exacerbate this prob-
lem since, absent U.S. funds,' 5' Colombians will become more
142. See Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1996.
143. The aid consisted mostly of helicopters, transport teams and military advi-
sors. Faces of the War, supra note 10, 129, at 8.
144. Id.
145. President of Asonal, an organization representing Colombia's judges and
judicial clerical workers. Fricker, supra note 116, at 54.
146. Id. at 57.
147. Id.
148. One might wonder whether it is a coincidence that social cleansing has
taken place in the plantain regions where two major U.S. fruit producers, Dole and
Chiquita, have fields. Telephone Interview with Juan Pablo Ordofiez, supra note 79.
149. For a thorough analysis of the poverty coffee-growers face, see NEW INTER-
NATIONALIST, Sept. 1995. ("The industry generates multi-million-dollar profits, which
the people who actually produce the coffee never see . . . . Although they work all
their lives for coffee, coffee has never worked for them.").
150. Fricker, supra note 116, at 57.
151. Funds will be depleted from both the U.S. government and investors. Tele-
[Vol. 27:2402
1995-96] SOCIAL CLEANSING IN COLOMBIA
dependent on the drug trade.
The drug war has been a primary focus of U.S. foreign
policymakers for approximately twenty years. Some argue that
since the loss of Russia as a prime concern, U.S. attention has
refocused on the drug war.'52 The belief is that if the U.S. can
battle external enemies - drug-producing countries - drug ad-
diction will be reduced within U.S. borders. This is a myth. The
solution to the U.S. internal drug problem lies in focusing on
internal demand for drugs, education and rehabilitation rather
than in increased foreign aid and military action.5 3 The decer-
tification measure is possibly an acknowledgment of the futility
of these efforts. However, the refusal to recognize Colombia's hu-
man rights violations is a tragic omission, as is the abdication of
U.S responsibility as drug consumers.
It is U.S. policy to make "assistance for the prevention and
suppression of international criminal activities ... a
priority." 5' In Colombia, the National Police seize four times
as much cocaine as the military.'55 Unfortunately, the bulk of
U.S. aid to Colombia since 1989 has "had a military empha-
sis," outnumbering at a ratio of two to one the aid offered to
phone Interview with Bruce M. Bagley, Professor of International Relations, Gradu-
ate School of International Studies, University of Miami (Apr. 22, 1996) ("There will
be a chilling effect on investment because of decertification.").
152. 'Now that the cold war is over, the armed services have become eager
participants in the drug war. It's their new meal ticket now that the commies are
not their big threat,' says a congressional staffer." Waller, Miller, Barry & Reiss,
Risky Business: As its Involvement in the Drug War Grows, the Pentagon Outlines a
Plan to Crush the Cartels, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1991, at 16, quoted in Manitzas,
supra note 133, at 323 n.37 (1991). See also Sherman, supra note 67, at 663 (citing
Nightline: Washington's Dwindling Importance (ABC television broadcast Apr. 27,
1990) (comments of P.J. O'Rourke, columnist for Rolling Stone Magazine, noting that
this observation was made prior to the Gulf War)).
153. Michael T. Klare, Scenario for a Quagmire: Fighting Drugs With the Mili-
tary, THE NATION, Jan. 1, 1990, at 8 (noting the punitive approach and arguing that
a supply-side focus would be more effective in the long run, but expensive as treat-
ment and education in the inner-cities is what would be required).
154. Act of Nov. 2, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-447, § 106, 108 Stat. 4694.
155. Peter D. Moore, Looking Ahead: The Drug War's Other Agenda, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1990, at D3.
156. An April 1990 report of the United States Committee on Government re-
veals that the majority of emergency assistance provided to Colombia in August
1989 under Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act was allocated to the mili-
tary (58.1%), whereas the police received only 16.1%. IS U.S. ANTI-NARCOTICS AS-
SISTANCE PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE?, INSTITUTO LATINAMERICANO DE
SERVICIoS LEGALES ALTERNATIVOS, HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING PAPER 2 (Mar. 1991).
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the police forces (acknowledged to be the institution most capa-
ble of countering the narcotics trade)."'57
Cocaine production troubles the U.S. (the consumers) more
than Colombia (the suppliers). The drug war has been waged by
the U.S. under a presumption that drugs are an undesirable
thing in Colombia.'58 In fact, the U.S. is the greatest consumer
of drugs in the world, while Colombians sell far more than they
consume.159 This connection is important as evidence of the ob-
vious self-interest that has motivated U.S. policy in Colombia,
particularly decertification.
Since drugs entered their economy, Colombians were faced
with the dilemma of whether to fight the influx of drugs and the
violence which often resulted or to accept it is a viable industry,
i.e., legalize it,"60  and celebrate the economic benefits. 8'
Colombia has already legalized possession of an amount of ad-
dictive drugs suitable for personal use in a private place.
182
The U.S. was outraged by this development." The U.S. ap-
pears to prefer the use of force to rehabilitation and a focus on
serious drug offenders. As one writer noted, "United States'
international drug control policy has addressed neither cultural,
political, nor socioeconomic underpinnings which have given rise
to the major role of Colombia in international drug traffick-
ing."'16
157. Manitzas, supra note 133, at 323.
158. Sherman, supra note 67, at 666 ("[An] assumption is that Colombia should
view the drug trafficking problem with moral disdain equal to that of the United
States.").
159. Id. at 668.
160. See C. Torres, Legalize It? Narcotics in Colombia, THE NATION, June 20,
1994, at 857.
161. Arthur L. Berney, Cocaine Prohibition: Drug-Induced Madness in the West-
ern Hemisphere, 15 B.C. THID WoRLD L.J. 19 (1995).
162. See In re Sochandamandou, File No. C-221/94 (Colom., C.S.J. May 5, 1994)
(the court indicated it was acting in the interest of human dignity and personal
freedom).
163. Torres, supra note 159.
164. See Sherman, supra note 67, at 668.
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B. Existing Statutes
U.S. statutes proscribing aid to countries violating human
rights exist, but implementation is lacking. The level of enforce-
ment depends upon each administration's willingness to enforce
adherence to U.S. laws." In litigation related to U.S. involve-
ment in international human rights violations, the most cited
statute is Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 on
human rights violations" and security assistance.167 Section
502B provides, in pertinent part:
No security assistance may be provided to any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. Secu-
rity assistance may not be provided to the police, domestic
intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a coun-
try... unless the President certifies in writing... that ex-
traordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such
assistance .... '
In addition, the Act provides that education and training
activities should be geared toward the promotion of human
rights.'69 The United States is violating this statute in its
training of Colombian soldiers, 6,844 of whom were trained
under the U.S. International Military Training and Education
program between 1984 and 1992.170
165. Steven B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights
Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 248 (1982) (noting the Nixon and Ford adminis-
trations avoided implementation of § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as
amended 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304)).
166. § 2304 (d)(1) provides for "gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights" to include: "Torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappear-
ance of persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of the person." Id. (empha-
sis added).
167. The statute defines security assistance as including aid, education, supplies
and training for the military, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance, and
economic support. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(dX2)(A-C).
168. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502B (as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2304).
169. 22 U.S.C. § 2347b(3) is Congress' declaration that education and training
"increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activi-
ties of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights." Id.
170. Wirpsa, supra note 7, at 9.
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Not only does Colombian aid violate the letter of the law, it
violates its spirit as well. The existing statutes demonstrate that
the aid given to Colombia is contrary to Congressional in-
tent.'7' Congress' policy on foreign assistance to developing
countries, codified at 22 U.S.C.A. Section 2151, provides that the
prosperity, security and liberties of the people of the U.S. are
best protected when humanitarian ideals are pursued and civil
rights defended.
C. Why We Should Act
Colombia is not as different from the United States as many
would like to think. The two societies share several qualities:
both are democracies; both are dominated by two political par-
ties; both have great disparity between the wealthy and the
poor; and both are fighting the War on Drugs. Perhaps the most
compelling similarity is that both societies view the lower-class
groups as eyesores. These similarities, together with the fact
that foreign policymakers are willing to violate U.S. statutes by
supporting gross human rights violations, must alert Americans
that violence and injustice akin to that seen in Colombia may
not be too implausible in the U.S.
This potential direction can be seen in America's internal
War on Drugs, which is also fraught with class-based discrimi-
nation. For example, the criminal penalties for crack-cocaine
possession are much harsher than for cocaine possession in its
powder form.'72 Drug enforcement is, therefore, often seen as a
war against the poor and an opportunity for the state to reassert
171. "It is the intent of the committee of conference to place renewed emphasis
on human rights as a major factor that must, as a matter of law, be taken into
account in making security assistance decisions." H.R. REP. No. 95-1546, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1868, 1874.
172. Mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines have resulted in racial dispari-
ties in sentencing for drug-related offenses. Nathaniel R. Jones, For Black Males and
American Society - The Unbalanced Scales of Justice: A Costly Disconnect, 23 CAP.
U. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1994). Possession of five grams of crack cocaine results in a
five-year sentence without parole. Ten grams results in a fifty year sentence. "For
the same sentence, a person would need 100 times as much powder cocaine." Id. at
22 n.59. See also Ronald Smothers, Wave of Prison Uprisings Provokes Debate on
Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A12 (connecting recent prison uprisings to
Congress' refusal to overturn disparities in sentences between crack offenders and
other drug offenders).
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its legal authority.'
The average U.S. taxpayer's contribution to the atrocities in
Colombia is not insignificant, but rather worthy of consideration.
One argument makes an analogy to the principal-agent relation-
ship, in which the latter is vested with control to act on behalf of
the former. This argument establishes the link as follows: dem-
ocratic government invests some of its citizens' tax money in
foreign affairs, with the knowledge and approval of the taxpay-
ers, serving as their agent or broker; the United States has
clearly supported brutal regimes, and continues to, with this
money; a person shares responsibility with her agent for the
actions of the latter, even if the former has no specific knowl-
edge of what the latter does with its broad powers." ' This ar-
gument seeks not to indict the public for the social cleansing in
Colombia, but rather to encourage the active pursuit of knowl-
edge on these issues.
V. SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Social cleansing is a complex problem involving many actors
which will continue as long as the prejudices exist in Colombian
culture. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Colombian governments do
not have to perpetuate the violence. Although eliminating the
U.S. role will not end the problem, reducing complicity is both
legally and morally required.
A. In the Legislative Branch
The U.S. is violating several statutes by giving any aid to
Colombia'75 and it must end its involvement in social cleans-
ing. This can be done in the legislature by passing a specific
statute either ceasing all aid and preferential tariffs to Colombia
or making aid conditional upon Colombia's compliance with
173. Austin, supra note 37, at 1784. "The drug war is the health of the state."
Id. (quoting Jefferson Morley, Contradictions of Cocaine Capitalism, THE NATION,
Oct. 2, 1989, at 341, 347).
174. Filice, supra note 135, at 409-10. (presenting this argument in a linear
fashion in response to an inquiry into U.S. citizens' responsibility for the atrocities
in Vietnam).
175. See supra part IV.B.
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international human rights law. Measures have been taken
recently which address Colombia specifically, but none concern
its human rights violations. On the contrary, any conditions
included in pending statutes are geared toward soliciting a solid
commitment from Colombia to fight the drug war, not on im-
proving human rights conditions. The statutes reward this com-
mitment by helping to strengthen police and military power in
order to combat drug trafficking. This enhancement of law en-
forcement frequently leads to a deterioration in compliance with
human rights standards.
76
1. Currently Pending Statutes
Lobbying Congress is a primary means by which the public
urges change in U.S. policy. The first step in this process is to
enact the Hatfield-McKinney Code of Conduct on Arms
Transfers Act of 1995,77 introduced in both the House and the
Senate, which prohibits United States military assistance and
arms transfers to foreign governments failing to adequately
protect human rights.
178
The Code of Conduct bill requires presidential certification
that all governments receiving military aid meet certain require-
ments, including promotion of civilian-controlled military
179
and respect of individual and minority rights."8 In addition,
the foreign government must promote human rights.'' The bill
expands the definition of "gross violations of internationally
176. "[Plrosecution of the drug. wars [as presently conceived], places increasing
autonomy and authority in the hands of Latin American armed forces. To put it
bluntly, drug wars encourage militarization. This can pose a substantial threat to
still-fragile democracies . . .and alter the political course of the region as a whole."
Peter H. Smith, The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Op-
tions, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 4-5 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1992), quoted in
Berney, supra note 160, at 47 (1995).
177. H.R. 772, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Code of Conduct bill].
178. In addition to passing this bill, enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act,
H.R. 1416 will provide rehabilitative services for victims of torture and protect tor-
ture victims seeking asylum or refugee status in the United States. See generally
M.E. Tardu, International Complaint Procedures for Violations of Human Rights, 28
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 337 (1988).
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recognized human rights" provided in Section 502B.. 2 to in-
clude "systematic official discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin or political affilia-
tion."" The government must also be one which "vigorously
investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes those responsible"'1
4
for the violations, and "does not impede the free functioning of
domestic and international human rights organizations.""s If
the President certifies to Congress that the country has ceased
to meet the requirements, the certification for that fiscal year
"shall cease to be effective."' The force of this bill in pro-
tecting international human rights depends upon the President's
active awareness and initiative. This is no small hurdle consid-
ering the political ramifications of terminating aid to a country
in which the U.S. has investment interests.
2. Country-Specific Legislation
Aside from lobbying efforts for new protections for interna-
tional human rights generally, Congress must be lobbied to draft
and pass legislation which specifically addresses Colombia's
violations. Several of these legislative measures are currently
pending,"s7 but the ones relating to Colombia have not condi-
tioned aid on the ceasing of its human rights violations, but
rather on its successful counternarcotics efforts.
One of the pending bills addressing the drug-producing
countries seeks to amend 22 U.S.C.A. Section 2291(k) and to
include conditions before Colombia can be certified.' Section
182. See supra note 108.
183. Emphasis added to stress Congressional contemplation of gender discrimina-
tion which arguably covers the abuse of homosexuals. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that State's ban on same-sex marriage presumptively violat-
ed the Hawaiian constitution's prohibition against sex discrimination because discrim-
ination against gay persons is gender discrimination where if that victim were of the
opposite gender, it would be acceptable to maintain sexual relations with his or her
lover).
184. Code of Conduct Bill, supra note 176.
185. Id. The Colombian government is in clear violation of this provision, as
evidenced by the frequent killings of human rights monitors. See generally AMERICAS
WATCH, POLITICAL MURDER AND REFORM IN COLOMBIA: THE VIOLENCE CONTINUES,
AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 18.
186. Code of Conduct Bill, supra note 176.




506 of the Foreign Aid Reduction Act of 1995 delineates eleven
conditions, none of which refers to the protection of human
rights. In fact, the bill suggests just the opposite in its promo-
tion of "tightening the law enforcement capabilities."8 '
Ideally, Congress would enact a statute making aid to Co-
lombia conditional on compliance with human rights norms.
Juan Pablo Ordofiez states that "money is the only pressure that
works in Colombia. We're just telling you to follow your own
laws."9 ° Conditionality is an interesting prospect because it
allows economic growth to promote compliance with human
rights. The U.S. saw a dramatic improvement in Peru's respect
of human rights when aid was made conditional.' 9' A bill of
this kind, relating to Turkey, is currently on the House and
Senate floors.9 2 This bill, introduced in March of 1995, is enti-
tled the "Turkish Human Rights Compliance Act." The sources
of information on the Turkish government's human rights abus-
es are the same as those that have documented the atrocities in
Colombia: the Department of State's "Country Reports on Hu-
man Rights," Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and
others.9 3
The Turkish Human Rights Compliance Act indicates that
the aid given will be diminished by $500,000 for each day that
Turkey does not comply with several conditions, including: al-
lowing human rights organizations to monitor the area, recog-
nizing Kurdish citizens' civil, cultural and human rights, and
protection of minority rights.' Enactment of a similar statute
relating to the human rights abuses of the Colombian govern-
ment would force it into compliance with international human
rights norms. One might think the U.S. has been reluctant to
condition aid to Colombia based on human rights considerations
because there is a concern that doing so would result in
Colombia's inability to fight its War on Drugs. Given the recent
decertification despite human rights concerns, perhaps the U.S.
has given up on fighting the War on Drugs, or else it was never
189. Id.
190. Telephone Interview with Juan Pablo Ordofiez, supra note 77.
191. All Things Considered, supra note 63.
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committed to it in the first place. It is more likely that the U.S.
is preoccupied with its own political and investment interests.
B. In the Judicial Branch
One might attempt to bring a suit in the U.S. courts enjoin-
ing any grant of aid to Colombia as violation of U.S. law. The
judicial branch defers to the legislative and executive branches
and avoids hearing cases on controversial issues in two ways:
standing and political question. In this case, these two doctrines
of judicial restraint are formidable obstacles to relief, consider-




The United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2 limits
what federal courts can hear to "cases or controversies." In other
words, to bring a case in federal court, one must have a credible
claim that (1) actual or threatened injury resulted; (2) which can
fairly be traced to the defendant's illegal conduct; and 3) can be
redressed through the judicial system.9 ' These requirements
are known as personal standing.'9 7
It would be difficult to obtain personal standing in a chal-
lenge to U.S. funding of Colombian atrocities. Suppose the plain-
tiff was a survivor of torture at the hands of the Colombian
government, or the family of a murdered victim, or a refugee
fleeing the oppressive situation; any one of these individuals
might be able to prove the injury in fact requirement, but that
the United States Government's policy was the cause in fact of
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Reagan, 637 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1986). "[The] Presi-
dent is exclusively responsible" for the "conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs." Id.
(citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950)).
196. valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
197. Third party standing is not discussed here because its success has been
limited due to notions of judicial self-restraint. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80, 98 (1978) (noting the prudential concerns for
limiting third party standing). However, the Court might grant third party standing
if one could show his or her ability to vindicate the rights of another, that their
relationship is strong enough to warrant such representation, and that the rights of
the third party would be diluted if standing were disallowed. JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12 (5th ed. 1995).
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the injury would be more difficult to prove. Indeed, redressibility
would also be a problem because there is no guarantee that if
the government stops giving money, or gives it conditionally,
that the killings will cease.19
a. Organizational Standing
A possible option is for an affected organization, such as
Amnesty International, to bring suit on this issue. An organiza-
tion "may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief
from injury to itself."99 Such an injury can be created by the
expenditure of the organization's resources to assure that the
challenged action or event does not occur.2" For example, Am-
nesty might argue that it has to spend more money and time in
Colombia because U.S. policy flies in the face of Amnesty's hu-
manitarian efforts there. In addition, the organization would
need to show a concrete injury to its own interests rather than
one of "abstract social interests.
20 1
It is important to note that the requirements for personal
standing are the same as those for organizational standing:
injury, traceability and redressability.2  Arguably, Amnesty
International or any of the organizations focusing on human
rights atrocities in Colombia might be able to allege a cognizable
interest to its efforts and to its members.
198. The remedy the plaintiff demands is vital. For example, if money damages
are sought in a wrongful death action, the courts might be reluctant to find for the
plaintiff unless she could prove she is in a distinct class. Otherwise, damages would
be available to the public at large. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 196. If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff seeks an injunction to prevent further disbursement of
funds to Colombia, the courts may hear reverberations from proponents of judicial
self-restraint.
199. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
200. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1470 (C.D.
Cal. 1992); see also U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
201. Douglas A. Parker, Standing to Litigate "Abstract Social Interests" in the
United States and Italy: Reexamining "Injury in Fact", 33 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
259, 318 (1995) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)). There
would probably not be the risk here of conflict among dissenting members inherent
in cases about organizational standing. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
202. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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b. Congressional Standing
If a person is unable to establish that she has a personal or
organizational stake in the outcome of a suit, she might attempt
to assert that Congress created standing in that case. Arguably,
by enacting a statute such as Section 502B of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, the legislature expected that it would be ad-
hered to and suits would arise upon violation.0 3 In other
words, by proscribing certain conduct Congress might create a
built-in remedy. One district court found, however, that this is
not the case with Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (as amended 22 U.S.C.A. Section 2304): "[tlhe only parties
with standing to seek adjudication under Section 2304 are the
executive and legislative branches.""'
Perhaps the best way to obtain standing when litigating this
issue is to have a member of the legislature bring the complaint.
The injury would be that a Congressperson who voted for a
particular bill to become law - which is thus compromised by
U.S. policy - has a right to demand compliance with the same
and standing to challenge the violation.05 The encroachment of
this right creates a personal injury in a professional capacity.
Traditionally, the only time a member of Congress can get
standing to sue the Executive is when the executive action at
issue nullified the Congressperson's vote.06
In Crockett v. Reagan,"7 however, the D.C. Circuit court
granted standing to twenty-nine members of Congress finding
that a grant of aid to El Salvador violated Section 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 196108 because El Salvador was en-
gaging in gross human rights violations.2" In Crockett, the
203. But see Clark v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (D.C. Md. 1985)
(holding that § 2304 "does not create standing for any taxpayer or any private party
to sue for its enforcement.").
204. Id. at 1249.
205. Another less certain injury alleged could be that the member of Congress is
breaking his or her oath to uphold the Constitution by serving a body which is in
violation of one of its own laws.
206. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (affording a
basis for standing only when the actions of the executive objectively nullify a con-
gressional vote or opportunity to vote).
207. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
208. 22 U.S.C. § 2304.
209. Standing in Crockett was granted because the plaintiffs were members of
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court found that there was a valid claim, but that the claim fell
into the category "characterized by a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolution"211 known as po-
litical question.2
c. Taxpayer Standing
Perhaps the weakest basis on which standing can be assert-
ed is based on taxpayer status. Suits involving a challenge to the
spending power" are extremely difficult to assert, and even
harder to win.21" There is a possibility that a court would grant
standing to individuals challenging the appropriation of funds as
violative of statutory law. For example, Congress is violating
several statutes215 which provide that the U.S. will not edu-
cate, train, or otherwise fund any country engaged in a continu-
al pattern of human rights violation. Unfortunately, Clark v.
United States216 denied standing to taxpayers bringing a Sec-
tion 502B challenge to U.S. aid to El Salvador.217
If a person or class is able to show a concrete injury in fact,
Congress; the case reached the political question stage and was dismissed at that
point. Clark v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 n.1 (D.C. Md. 1985) (noting
that Crockett is the only reported case under § 2304).
210. Id. at 898.
211. See infra part V.B.2.a.
212. Id. The seminal case in this area is Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923) (holding that a federal taxpayer lacks standing to challenge a federal law
providing grants to states as violative of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
because there was no injury particular to the plaintiff).
213. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court insisted that it was not
imposing an absolute bar to suits by federal taxpayers challenging unconstitutional
spending. Flast imposed a two-part test under which the taxpayer must be challeng-
ing an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power, as well as establish a nexus
between her taxpayer status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged. While this test is workable, Flast has been limited to its facts.
214. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio Bldg. Auth., 74 Ohio Ops. 2d 184 (1975) (rec-
ognizing the common law right to maintain actions against public officials enjoining
the misapplication of public funds).
215. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2151, 2304, 2347b, 5036 (1995).
216. 609 F. Supp. 1249 (D.C. Md. 1985) (holding that despite ample proof of El
Salvador's human rights violations, § 2304 does not create standing for private par-
ties).
217. While not binding, Clark might prove dispositive in a case challenging the
U.S. aid to Colombia in that the violated statutes are the same in both situations.
Id.
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economic or otherwise,2 18 and prove that the injury is within
the "zone of interests"219 that Congress intended to protect
when it enacted the statute, courts might grant relief. Given the
Court's reluctance to consider constitutional challenges, this
approach might be more successful. Since granting aid to a coun-
try engaging in human rights violations is a difficult issue to
resolve in light of separation of powers concerns, the Court is
likely to use standing as a tool to avoid decision.22 ° Therefore,
it is important to think strategically when attempting to estab-
lish standing.
2. Political and Foreign Policy Considerations
In addition to standing, three other issues are implicated by
judicial redressibility of this problem. Essentially, each issue
involves adhering to separation of powers notions.
a. Political Question
Even if one is able to prove standing, U.S. courts might
regard the issue as a nonjusticiable political question violating
the separation of powers doctrine.22" ' The courts would probably
not entertain a suit brought against the executive branch for the
violation of Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
because it could be regarded as an issue which involves policy
choices delegated to another branch by the Constitution.222 For
similar reasons, law suits brought by Congresspersons enjoining
the actions of the executive branch are likely to be avoided by
218. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970).
219. Id. at 153.
220. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 194 (noting that the Court often requires
"more standing" in hard cases than it might require in easier cases).
221. Political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally com-
mitted for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the executive
branch. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 106 S. Ct. 2860 (D.C. Cir.
1986). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 200, § 3534.
222. See In re Schiavone v. U.S., 766 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 569 (1985) (holding that the doctrine of separation of powers precludes an indi-
vidual from invoking power of a court to compel the government to act on behalf of




b. General Deference to the Legislature
The U.S. government executive and legislative branches are
granted broad discretion in developing foreign policy. Courts are
reluctant to take an active role in formulating foreign policy"'
and deference therefore constitutes an important exception to
judicial review." Case law provides that foreign affairs is de-
monstrably committed to the legislative and executive branches
of the government, 26 and therefore the courts are normally
deferential on issues implicating foreign affairs.
c. Act of State
If suit was brought against Colombia in U.S. courts for
violations of its own constitution, the suit could be barred by the
act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine227 has been de-
scribed as the foreign policy counterpart of the political question
doctrine.22 It is a judicially-created doctrine with "constitution-
al underpinnings"22  based on separation of powers con-
cerns.23° The Supreme Court explained the doctrine as follows:
223. Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that law suits
by members of Congress for declaratory or injunctive relief against either officials of
the Executive Branch or their fellow legislators respecting the constitutionality of the
way the latter have gone about their business are generally not to be entertained by
the Judicial Branch).
224. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 196, § 6.4.
225. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 (articulation of the doctrine of
judicial review where Justice Marshall said questions would be deemed "political" if
there was "legal discretion" in the circumstances).
226. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Baker, however, indicated that
there are some instances where there was no conclusive Congressional or executive
action, and where judicial review of foreign affairs issues is appropriate. Congress'
blatant disregard of international human rights concerns in its decertification of
Colombia for its drug war failures might constitute one of these exceptions.
227. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (recognizing
that there is a "federal common law" which is binding upon the U.S. and holding
that the act of state doctrine bars judicial condemnation of the validity of public
acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory).
228. Agapita Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207, slip op. (D. Haw. 1986).
229. Id. at 423.
230. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 196, § 6.4.
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"Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory."
23 ' The Courts use restraint
2 32
and generally defer to the executive on issues of foreign poli-
cy,233 although not every issue dealing with foreign relations is
unreviewable.2" This uneven use of the act of state doctrine
has prompted calls for its abolition." The problem is accentu-
ated where the president's political considerations2 3 will not
allow the necessary changes.
In Latin America, there is a phrase which translates as
"[t]he water must be taken away from the fish."237 Applying
the concept of conditionality is one way to force Colombia to
improve its human rights compliance without running afoul of
the act of state doctrine. Perhaps the U.S. should follow the
example of the European Community, which adopted a declara-
tion in 1986 stating that respect for human rights would be a
condition of cooperation and that denouncing a country's human
rights violations was not an interference in the state's af-
fairs. 8 Under President Jimmy Carter, favorable trade status
231. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
232. "The doctrine was developed .. . as a principle of judicial restraint, essen-
tially to avoid disrespect for foreign states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. a (1987).
233. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767-68,
reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972), on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973) (the
Court should not apply the act of state doctrine when the executive branch claims
that such application would impede U.S. foreign policy).
234. Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 390
(1988).
235. Some believe that the act of state doctrine should be abolished because it is
implemented with inconsistency. See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 329 (1986).
236. There are significant ramifications to ceasing or conditioning aid to a for-
eign country to insist on conformity with human rights standards. Human rights are
usually not the highest priority in devising foreign policy.
The question is not human rights versus no human rights; instead it is
human rights versus friendly relations with existing regimes versus eco-
nomic benefits to the domestic economy versus humanitarian aid to im-
poverished people.
Lars Schoultz, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA
109-10 (1981).
237. Manitzas, supra note 131, at 316.
238. K Kumado, Conditionality: An analysis of the policy of linking development
aid to the implementation of human rights standards, 50 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REv.
23, 25 (1993).
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and foreign aid to Colombia were conditional upon improved
compliance with human rights norms.239 Colombia announced
at the 1993 United Nations Human Rights Conference in Vi-
enna, that human rights are a "matter of national sovereignty,
arguing that punitive trade sanctions would hurt its econo-
my."
240
VI. CONCLUSION: IDEAS FOR ACTION
Colombia flagrantly violates the human rights of its lower-
class inhabitants. Vigilante groups, often composed of police offi-
cers as well as members of the military, engage in social cleans-
ing with impunity. Social cleansing is well-organized and ritual-
istic, rather than sporadic.24' What is unique about this prob-
lem is that Colombia has simultaneously been the recipient of
the largest amount of U.S. military aid for several years and the
region's worst human rights violator.242
The United States must follow its own laws and policies and
exert pressure on the Colombian government to end the sense-
less killings characteristic of social cleansing. The Colombian
authorities have concealed the human rights crisis, enabling the
security forces to "literally get away with murder on a daily
basis."2' The U.S. needs to develop "a fresh approach to Co-
lombia, one divorced from the drug war."2" In fact, social
cleansing is ancillary to the drug war; there is no necessary
correlation between them."'5 As one reporter writing from
BogotA noted, "t]he problem here is less the war on drugs than
the war against the poor."
24
The U.S. is ostensibly committed to fighting for human
239. Dermota, supra note 34, at 14 (quoting Juan Tokatlian, dean of the School
of International Studies at the University of the Andes in Bogotai).
240. Id.
241. ROJAS, supra note 12, at 78.
242. Jeffrey, supra note 31, at 380.
243. Wirpsa, supra note 7.
244. Robin Kirk, A War Against Ideas, Not Drugs; Political Cleansing in Colom-
bia, THE NATION, May 17, 1993, at 64.
245. The only aspect in which social cleansing is a direct result of the drug war
is in cases where children believed to be drug runners are killed. See supra text
accompanying notes 37-39.
246. Jeffrey, supra note 31, at 380.
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rights and holds itself out to be a country that promotes compli-
ance with international human rights norms. While we cannot
expect to stop the violence, we must at least end our role in
promoting it. The change can most likely be effected in the legis-
lature because the restrictive doctrines of standing and political
question probably preclude judicial consideration of the issue.
Lobbying the legislature to pass currently pending bills, or draft
a new Colombia-specific bill is the most plausible solution, but it
must be one that seeks to enforce compliance with human rights
norms. Another method is to exert pressure on Congresspersons
to obey the existing laws by threatening to expose their support
of the aid to the media. This might be effective if the media
campaign is high-profile and uses the names of those who sup-
port this policy. The best places to exert pressure are within
"officialdom": government, educational institutions and the
press.247 Word of mouth is effective in creating a "ripple effect,"
especially when someone in power or with access to the public
becomes aware.2"
Whether the ultimate means are conditionality9" or
total withdrawal of funds, the U.S. must send a clear message
that the international community will not tolerate, much less
support, a government that directly, or indirectly, violates its
citizens' human rights with impunity. Rather than providing the
very weapons used to carry out the massacres, the United States
should help to avert these atrocities through the creation of an
international climate hostile to offending regimes.25 ° "Perhaps
if most people acted collectively, harm-prevention would be quite
significant."251 It is conceivable that several world powers on
whom Colombia depends can come together to exert affirmative
pressure on Colombia to comply with international human rights
norms.
It is unrealistic to expect an end to social cleansing without
a total change in those attitudes and values in Colombian soci-
ety that have resulted in this legacy of violence. The impunity
with which the violence is carried out may be curbed by external
247. Filice, supra note 137, at 405.
248. Id.
249. A viable option is to place similar conditions on funding as were imposed
against Peru in 1991. Kirk, supra note 243.
250. Filice, supra note 137, at 413.
251. Id. at 404.
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pressure. This pressure could force the Colombian government to
use its resources to develop effective educational programs to
end these class-based killings. Perhaps most important is the
need for effective and humane public safety so that people do not
feel they have the option of taking the law into their own hands.
Colombia must return to the rule of law 2 and a more equal
distribution of power among the arms of the government to in-
crease accountability. Only by changing these structural inad-
equacies will an ideological shift begin to take place.
The media gatekeepers must consider the morality of main-
taining the ignorance of U.S. citizens concerning this issue.'
One can hardly use the appellation "moral" when one is con-
cerned only with the "pursuit of ends benefitting oneself and
one's own."' The economic interests of the government and
private corporations, combined with a perception that some of
the victimized groups are not worthy of concern, might explain
why there is a dearth of information available to the public in
the mainstream media. But the problem of ignorance is easily
solved, and the U.S. is not solving it. It is my hope that com-
ments such as this can open a path toward greater awareness.
ELIZABETH F. SCHWARTZ*
252. See generally Pahl, supra note 4 (an analysis of Colombia's current system
and recommendations for how to institute reforms in the criminal justice system).
253. See, e.g., id. ("The press are guilty of failing to inform themselves and the
public of the atrocities.").
254. Id. at 405.
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